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Summary 
As computer networks evolve, so too does the 
techniques used by attackers to exploit new 
vulnerabilities. Natural ecosystems already have 
resistant and resilient properties that help 
protect them from unwanted disturbances 
despite the existence of different vulnerabilities. 
Computer networks and their environments can 
be considered as digital ecosystems with 
different vulnerabilities, and security attacks can 
be considered as unwanted disturbances. 
Analysis of vulnerabilities and attacks from this 
perspective may open up new ecosystem-based 
security strategies. 
 This study therefore considers computer 
networks from an ecosystem perspective with a 
focus on the location of vulnerabilities at 
different scales and their link to undesirable 
security disturbances. The location of 
vulnerabilities are considered from a physical, 
functional and time perspective; all aspects which 
are important within ecosystems and hence also 
important for defining ecosystem-based security 
strategies. Knowing when, and where strategies 
should be employed and their potential impact in 
reducing the level of disturbance to network 
services will contribute to their effective usage. 
The link to security disturbances are considered 
through the exploitation route, the attack 
method, and the attack motivation. 
Understanding this linkage can help to develop 
strategies that target vulnerabilities associated 
with a particular disturbance event such as 
malware propagation. 
1. Introduction 
Computer networks and their application 
environments can be thought of as digital 
ecosystems [1, 2] where social and technical 
interactions between devices, users, organisations, 
and the physical environment combine to produce 
a multitude of services (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 - Digital ecosystem 
Many security techniques for computer networks 
are focused upon detection and removal of known 
threats, but unknown attacks can happen very 
quickly creating wide spread devastation. New 
techniques are therefore required which enable 
networks to be more tolerant of malicious activity, 
even when there is an entirely new form of attack. 
By considering such networks from an ecosystem 
perspective facilitates the adoption of ecological 
principles into security policies. Within such a 
paradigm, security attacks can be thought of as 
destructive disturbances at the individual, 
community, or ecosystem scale affecting the 
functioning of the services provided by the 
network. Some previous work has looked at how 
natural ecosystems tolerate disturbances such as 
viruses and droughts, and how these underlying 
principles such as biodiversity can be applied to 
improve the security of computer networks [3]. 
The research proposed an ecosystem resilience 
model for a computer network, hypothesising that 
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the destructive effect on function and services 
from security attack disturbances can be 
counterbalanced by constructive biodiversity 
strategies. 
In order to improve digital ecosystem tolerance to 
disturbance and devise effective biodiversity 
strategies it is necessary to understand the 
vulnerabilities that lie at all scales within a digital 
ecosystem and their link to particular 
disturbances. The research here investigates the 
location of vulnerabilities at the individual, 
community and ecosystem scales and links these 
to the disturbances that arise within such an 
environment. This location analysis will provide 
some insight into where vulnerabilities are located 
and which aspects could be made more diverse.  
2. Vulnerabilities 
When assessing a computer network and it’s 
environment from an ecosystem perspective, it is 
necessary to consider vulnerabilities arising from; 
the hardware and the software at the individual 
scale, the interactions at the community scale, and 
the beneficial users, policy makers and 
organisations at the ecosystem scale. All of these 
need to be considered simultaneously because 
diversity will need to be employed at all scales for 
maximum effectiveness. There is a danger that if 
this is not achieved correctly a shift in exploitation 
may occur, for example from software malware to 
hardware malware [4]. 
There has been a great deal of research into 
security attacks and their classifications. There has 
been some, but less research into vulnerabilities 
and their classifications, and even less research 
into general links between vulnerabilities and 
attacks. This may be partly due to companies’ 
reluctance in publicising information regarding 
weaknesses in their products. It may also be 
because new vulnerabilities and exploits are being 
discovered every day, usually by specialist 
researchers or hackers and are often discussed on 
a case by case basis. Because of this, the scope 
associated with vulnerabilities is very large. 
Published research of multiple vulnerabilities are 
often limited to specific systems, for example 
Kamara et all [5] did an analysis of vulnerabilities 
in internet firewalls, and Jiwani and Zelkowitz [6] 
looked at security flaws in operating systems. 
Whilst these are useful for the specialised areas 
they do not cover the scope associated with a 
digital ecosystem. There are a number of public 
databases and lists that exist containing 
vulnerability information, such as the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [7], the Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [8], the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list [9], and 
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 
dictionary of software weakness types [10]. 
Although they contain a lot of information, they 
are mostly software focused and are far from user 
friendly. When this study was conducted entries 
were often sparse or incomplete and generating 
queries for specific information or gathering 
statistical data was difficult. The Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) [11] is more 
user friendly but limits the scope to vulnerabilities 
and attacks of web applications only. Despite this 
limitation, many of the web-based vulnerabilities 
feature highly in other databases as important 
general software vulnerabilities that should be 
avoided. This is not surprising since we are 
becoming more and more dominated by web 
applications and services.   
This paper brings together a number of sources of 
information to highlight some of the most popular 
vulnerabilities that could affect digital ecosystems 
at different scales. The location of the vulnerability 
is considered from a time (source), physical, and 
functional perspective; all aspects which are 
important within ecosystems and defining 
biodiversity strategies. The links between 
vulnerability and attack disturbances is 
investigated by looking at the effects of the 
vulnerabilities, the attack methods used to exploit 
the vulnerability, and the motivations of the 
attack.  
3. Vulnerability Location 
The ‘location’ of a vulnerability can mean different 
things depending upon the research focus. Jiwnani 
and Zelkowitz [6] use vulnerability location for 
software auditing to mean functional areas. Garcia 
et all  [12] uses vulnerability location to mean 
physical layers of operating system code. The CWE 
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list uses the time of introduction as the source 
location. Previous research [3] suggests that all 
three of these aspects: physical (or spatial), 
functional, and time (or source) are important 
parameters in the biodiversity of healthy 
ecosystems. Whilst source location and functional 
location can be generalised into areas that are 
transparent across scales, physical location is more 
specific across scales because is dependent upon 
the architecture and physical attributes. A list of 
these areas is given in table 1. 
Table 1 – Vulnerability Location 
Source  Functional Physical 
Design 
Implementation\
Manufacture 
Configuration\ 
Installation 
Operation  
Monitoring 
Resource 
Management 
Authorisation\
Authentication 
Data 
Processing 
Input\Output 
Interaction 
 
Specific to each 
scale  
– see Table 2 
 
Source Location 
The categories for source location were chosen 
because they can be generalised across scales. 
They adopt those used within CWE, with the 
addition of ‘manufacture’ and ‘installation’ to 
make it clear how hardware can be incorporated, 
as well as software. Vulnerabilities introduced at 
the ‘design’ stage can be from poor design 
decisions, inadequate requirements, or the 
adoption of weak security policies. Vulnerabilities 
introduced at the ‘implementation/manufacture’ 
stage can be from poor coding practices, 
inadequate code checking tools or processes, or 
the use of programming languages that are prone 
to specific vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows. 
Not all vulnerabilities are accidental however; they 
may be inserted intentionally, for example loop 
holes to allow product manufactures back door 
entries into devices, foreign government spying, 
and insiders with a malicious intent or motivated 
by financial gain. Vulnerabilities introduced at the 
‘configuration/installation’ stage can be based on 
whether the final product is configured or installed 
as intended, for example ensuring the appropriate 
security mechanisms have been set-up. 
Vulnerabilities introduced at the ‘operation’ stage 
could stem from user interaction, incorrect use, or 
environmental effects. 
Functional Location 
The majority of vulnerability research is focused 
upon software as this is where the majority of 
vulnerabilities currently lie.  Jiwnani and Zelkowitz 
[6] use functional location as part of their 
susceptibility matrix for categorising operating 
system flaws. Categories include system 
initialization, memory management, process 
management, device management, file 
management, and identification/authentication. 
Kamara et all [5] uses functional operations for 
analysing vulnerabilities within firewalls including 
application level, reassembly, IP/port filtering, 
legality checks, dynamic rule set, and NAT/PAT. 
The categories used within this study were chosen 
to be transparent across scales in order to 
generate a coherent structure. They were devised 
by generalising the scale specific categories, such 
as those listed above. The ‘Monitoring’ category 
includes keeping track of device location, network 
monitoring, and software and hardware behaviour 
monitoring. ‘Resource management’  includes 
memory, process, device, and file management at 
the lower scales, as well as resource management 
and topology control in terms of the whole 
network community at the upper scales. 
‘Authorisation\Authentication’ includes not only 
these two access control security features but also 
covers other features such as validating access, 
identification and encryption and in some cases is 
closely linked to input/output interaction which 
could include messages and commands or user 
interaction for example. Data processing’ covers 
the processing of signals or data in the hardware, 
data processing and algorithms in the software, 
routing of network data messages within the 
community, and data processing services within 
the ecosystem. ‘Input\Output Interaction’ includes 
the interaction between hardware components 
and the input and output to the hardware, the 
interaction between software components and the 
input and output to the software, the interaction 
between nodes and the input and output to the 
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community, and the interaction between 
communities and other ecosystem components as 
well as the input and output to the ecosystem.  
Physical Location 
The physical location of vulnerabilities has been 
segregated into physical partitions or layers, as 
shown in table 2, which are different at each scale. 
Where possible these partitions have been 
adopted from the literature. Where this was not 
possible, partitions have been chosen to naturally 
reflect the vulnerabilities listed in the matrices, 
section 11. The individual scale is split between 
hardware and software, each with a different list 
of physical locations. The hardware locations 
include the primary components associated with 
modern printed circuit boards. These include 
integrated circuits, embedded software, firmware, 
and inputs and outputs. Integrated circuits include 
the processor chip, memory, and driver chips etc. 
Some of the software locations have been adopted 
from Garcia et all’s research on operating system 
vulnerabilities [12], where OS Drivers, and OS 
System Software are used. Extra categories have 
been created to separate vulnerabilities within 
applications such as web applications, database 
applications, and other applications. 
Vulnerabilities within the community scale reflect 
those associated with network operations rather 
than the actual software vulnerabilities which may 
be present. This is reflected in table 2 where the 
community partitions are located on the right 
hand side spanning hardware and software 
partitions on the left. Categories at the community 
scale have been largely adopted from Wood and 
Stankovic’s [13] categorisation of attacks since 
many vulnerabilities at this scale lie within the 
communication mechanism between devices 
where those based on wireless connections are 
particularly vulnerable. They use a subset of the 
OSI model to describe specific attack methods and 
their vulnerabilities at each layer of the network. 
Categories include physical, link, network, and 
transport. The application category has been 
added here to reflect additional application level 
vulnerabilities in the network.  Ecosystem 
partitions include all the physical nodes, the users, 
government and commercial organisations, and 
the application environment. 
Table 2 – Physical Location Partitions 
Application Environment 
Users 
 
Government/Commercial 
Organisation 
All Physical Nodes 
Web App  Database App Other App 
Application 
OS System Software & services 
OS Core libraries 
Transport 
Network 
OS Drivers 
Link 
Physical Embedded Software Firmware 
Integrated Circuits 
Inputs and Outputs 
 
4. Vulnerability – Disturbance 
Within a digital ecosystem security attacks are 
considered as disturbances and vulnerabilities 
allow these to take place. The vulnerability itself 
will determine the type of ‘exploitation route(s)’ 
that the disturbance may use. How the 
disturbance is achieved is determined by the 
‘attack method’, and the attack method is often 
incited by an ‘attack motivation’.  
Exploitation routes and attack motivations have 
been generalised into categories that are 
transparent across scales, although not all are 
applicable to every scale. A list of these are given 
in table 3. Attack methods are specific for each 
scale because they are dependent upon the 
architecture and physical characteristics. These 
attack methods are listed in tables 5, 7, 9, and 11. 
Table 3 – Vulnerability Disturbance 
Exploitation 
route 
Attack method Attack 
motivation 
By-pass 
protection 
mechanism 
Information 
leakage 
Tampering 
Social 
Engineering 
Execute 
code/command 
Denial of service 
Specific to each 
scale  
see Tables 
5,7,9,11 
Service 
Disruption 
Identity Theft 
Data Theft 
Malicious 
Control 
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Exploitation route 
When considering the linkage between 
vulnerabilities and disturbances it is useful to 
identify the effect that the vulnerability may have. 
For example the vulnerability may allow security 
mechanisms to be by-passed, or the execution of 
code. This gives the attacker a route for 
exploitation. For software vulnerabilities, CWE lists 
these as ‘effects’ and includes: by-pass protection 
mechanism, read application data, modify 
application data, read files, modify files, execute 
unauthorised code/command, denial of service - 
crash/ exit/restart, and denial of service – resource 
consumption. In terms of hardware, Grand [14] 
defines a list of threat types: interception, 
interruption, modification style, and fabrication 
style, whereas Li et all [15] defines hardware 
attack categories as: information leakage, 
tampering, and denial of service. Although the 
literature describes them as threat or attack types 
they can be considered as general categories for 
exploitation routes. Denial of service for example 
is categorised as a software vulnerability effect, 
and file\data modification could be considered as 
modification style or tampering. At the community 
scale a majority of the vulnerabilities permit a 
denial of service as the exploitation route. At the 
ecosystem scale social engineering and security 
loopholes provide the necessary exploitation 
paths. Combining these into a general list of 
exploitation routes is given in table 3. 
Attack Methods 
Attack methods listed within this paper are specific 
for each scale because they are dependent upon 
the architecture. As stated previously there has 
been much literature describing comprehensive 
taxonomies for attacks, but there has been little 
research in trying to formulate links between 
vulnerabilities and attack methods. Most of the 
attack methods listed here, and their links to 
vulnerabilities, have been inferred from the attack 
and vulnerability literature which is discussed 
further in sections 5 to 8. The CWE list of 
vulnerabilities however, attempts to bridge the 
gap for software. Each vulnerability description 
lists relevant attack patterns that cross reference 
to a CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration 
and Classification) number. CAPEC is a public 
dictionary of security attack methods for software 
[16]. Because the CAPEC dictionary is hierarchical 
it can also be viewed as a method of classification, 
although CWE does not distinguish this hierarchy 
within the referencing. This cross referencing of 
CAPEC has therefore been adopted for the 
software attack methods listed within this paper 
(Table 7). 
Attack Motivation 
The motivation of an attacker is relevent to every 
scale of an ecosystem, but the ‘details’ about what 
motivates an attacker is not widely researched. 
Rounds and Pendgraft [17] suggest that attacker 
motivations are linked to fun and adventure, 
recognition, political, to investigate criminal 
activity, state sponsored, and financial and 
defensive. Gandhi et all [18] described that cyber 
attack motives fit into three categories: political 
factors, socio-cultural factors and economic 
factors. Grand [14] defines motivation in terms of 
attack goals for hardware which include: 
competition, theft of service, user authentication, 
privilege escalation, focused attack, lunchtime 
attack style, insider attack. Li et all [15] stated that 
most attack goals, which can also be attack types, 
can be classified into three categories; information 
leakage, tampering, and denial of service. The 
categories defined within this study use attack 
goals as the motivating factors, and have been 
adapted from those listed above to include the 
following categories: service disruption, identity 
theft, data theft, and malicious control. Service 
disruption signifies that the motive is to disrupt 
services at the node, the network, or the 
ecosystem. Identity theft can often mean 
impersonation at the node level or stealing a 
user’s identity at the ecosystem level for acts such 
as credit card fraud. Data theft covers a wide 
range of motives, from stealing data for financial 
gain, to exposing sensitive information. Malicious 
control signifies the motivation for the control of 
nodes such as zombies for botnets.  
5. Individual (Hardware) Vulnerability matrix 
In the past, the focus of device security has been 
on software, but it is not just software that is 
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vulnerable to security attacks. The vulnerability 
matrices (Tables 4 and 5) include hardware 
vulnerabilities that are being discussed in the 
media and research. One growing concern is the 
methods by which chips are designed and 
manufactured. Global outsourcing has become 
more common in recent years due to the 
increased complexity of chip designs whilst 
minimising costs. Many people and organisations 
responsible for the design and manufacture of 
such chips are spread around the globe. It is 
entirely possible for hardware Trojans to be 
inserted secretly within a computer chip due to 
the outsourcing of the design of sub-sections of 
the chip or buying in third party IP [19]. The 
Trojans could be placed at any functional location 
within the hardware, and can be physically placed 
within the circuitry of a dedicated ASIC 
(Application Specific Integrated Circuit), 
implemented within the firmware of 
reconfigurable devices, or hidden within 
embedded software pre-programmed into 
memory. Given that it is not possible to test every 
input condition, such Trojans are likely to go 
unnoticed until sometime later when their effects 
become apparent. In addition to this, many 
hardware devices are fixed so cannot be patched 
like software, and therefore need to be replaced. 
There are some strategies being developed to 
detect such malicious circuits whilst in operation. 
They mostly involve including extra hardware to 
police the chip from the inside [20]. However, 
there are examples where products have already 
been shipped with malware such as a password 
stealing Trojan that infected Seagate disk drives 
built in China in 2007, as well as Samsung digital 
picture frames which had to be recalled in 2008 
when malware was found pre-loaded on the 
internal storage [21]. Another hardware 
vulnerability that is widely documented is the 
vulnerability of a device’s physical inputs and 
outputs to manipulation or monitoring which is an 
inherent design feature of an electronic device. 
Such attacks exploiting this vulnerability include 
eavesdropping and fault injection which can lead 
to message corruption. One such example of 
transient fault injection was demonstrated in 2010 
by altering the voltage supply of a programmable 
device in order to analyse the corrupted messages 
and extract the system’s 1024-bit RSA private key 
information [22]. Another vulnerability that is 
often considered as part of the hardware is low 
level chip code such as BIOS code. But like all 
software, it can still contain exploitable 
vulnerabilities. These are not listed here; instead, 
specific software vulnerabilities are discussed in 
section 6 and listed in Table 6/7. An example of an 
attack exploiting BIOS code was in 2008 when an 
exploit was discovered that could take advantage 
of an Intel CPU caching vulnerability to gain 
unauthorised access to a protected region of 
system memory [23], thereby by-passing security 
mechanisms and allowing information leakage or 
modification.  This type of vulnerability can stem 
from design or implementation errors. The last 
hardware vulnerability that will be considered 
here is the vulnerability associated with the fact 
that hardware is a physical object that can be 
accessed. The source of this could be inherent in 
the design, or introduced at the installation stage 
where the device is not physically secured. The 
effect associated with this is that the hardware can 
then be tampered with, leading to physical 
modification, internal damage, or the extraction of 
data. Motives include service disruption and data 
theft.  
6. Individual (Software) Vulnerability matrix 
There are various schemes for categorising 
software vulnerabilities and attacks [24, 25]. More 
specific information regarding actual software 
vulnerabilities and their attributes can be found in 
vulnerability databases. These are often large, and 
extracting information regarding the most 
prevalent vulnerabilities is difficult. A more 
focused list has been produced as a collaboration 
between MITRE, the SANS Institute and other 
security experts. The yearly list details the top 25 
most dangerous software errors [26]. The list for 
2010 has been used here as the basis for 
investigating software vulnerabilities, their 
location, and links to attacks. The list uses CWE 
identifiers, which in turn reference CAPEC attack 
patterns (Tables 6 and 7). Interestingly, all of the 
top 25 software vulnerabilities can be located 
within web applications, and a large proportion 
can also be found in database applications. More 
and more of our lives involve interacting with the 
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web and generating or retrieving data, so this is 
therefore not an unsurprising result. More 
traditional vulnerabilities still exist; for example 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities are still a major 
problem and are discussed further.  
At the top of this software vulnerability list is the 
improper Neutralization of inputs during web page 
generation (no. 1). This vulnerability is located in 
web applications and is described as the most 
prevalent, obstinate, and dangerous vulnerability. 
It is introduced at the design or implementation 
stage when non-vetted libraries or frameworks are 
used, and untrusted inputs are not accounted for 
or mitigated against. This type of vulnerability can 
lead to protection mechanisms being by-passed, 
information leaks tampering, and the execution of 
unauthorised code or commands. The most 
common attack method is via script injection, 
often called cross-site-scripting, where attackers 
can inject Javascript or other content into a web 
page that the unsuspecting application generates. 
The web page is then accessed by other users, 
whose browsers execute the malicious script as if 
it came from the unsuspecting application. Given 
the fact that this vulnerability is located in web 
applications, it is not surprising that cross-site 
scripting attacks are high on OWASP’s top 10 list of 
the worst security risks in web applications[27]. 
The second most dangerous software vulnerability 
is the improper neutralization of special elements 
used in an SQL command (no. 2). This is often 
found in web-based databases. As we generate 
more and more data, so will the necessity of web-
based database manipulation; such as submitting 
and extracting data, and searching and filtering 
information. If mitigation measures are not taken 
at the design, implementation and operation 
stages, attackers can modify SQL queries used in 
security controls such as authentication to bypass 
security and steal, corrupt, or modify data. This 
type of attack is called SQL injection and is listed as 
the number one web application security risk in 
2010 by OWASP. Other vulnerabilities that do not 
properly deal with external inputs include the 
reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision 
(no. 6), improper limitation of a pathname to a 
restricted directory (no.7), and improper 
neutralisation of special elements in an OS 
command (no. 9). An attacker can change these 
inputs affecting authentication and authorisation 
allowing them to by-pass security. Another related 
vulnerability, but is unique to a single 
programming language is the improper control of 
filename for include/require statement in PHP 
program (no. 13). This is where the PHP 
application incorrectly restricts the input before its 
usage in ‘require’ and ‘include’ functions. This can 
allow an attacker to execute code by specifying a 
URL to a remote location or a local file.  
The third vulnerability is decades old, but despite 
this, is still in the top three. A buffer copy without 
checking the size of the input often leads to the 
well known classic buffer overflow attack. This 
vulnerability can be located in any part of the code 
or functionality, but stems from implementation 
errors when using programming languages such as 
C or C++. As a result it is not usually found in web 
applications which use other programming 
languages such as Java, but the vulnerability is still 
prominent in general and underlying software. 
This vulnerability can allow the execution of 
unauthorised code or commands, or allow a denial 
of service through a crash or resource 
consumption. Other buffer or memory array 
related vulnerabilities include buffer access with 
incorrect length value (no.12), improper validation 
of array index (no.14), integer overflow or 
wraparound (no.17), and incorrect calculation of 
buffer size (no.18). 
MITRE and SANS call the fourth vulnerability cross-
site request forgery which is often given as the 
name of the corresponding attack method. This 
vulnerability lies within the web application and 
comes fifth on OWASP’s risk list. Here, the 
application does not sufficiently verify whether a 
request was intentionally provided by the user 
who submitted the request. In this scenario it is 
possible for an attacker to trick a user into making 
an unintentional request to the web server which 
is then treated as an authentic request. This can 
lead to data theft or service disruption. 
Improper authorisation is fifth on the list. This 
vulnerability is due to the software not correctly 
authorising actions such as accessing resources. If 
users are able to access data or perform actions 
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that are not allowed, this can lead to security 
mechanisms being bypassed, information leakage, 
denial of service, and code execution. Another 
vulnerability related to the access of resources is 
the incorrect permission assignment for critical 
resource (no.21) where a resource is given a 
permissions setting providing access to a wider 
range than required. This can lead to the exposure 
of sensitive information. When the software 
allocates a resource without imposing any 
restrictions on how many resources can be 
allocated (no. 22), an attacker can prevent others 
from accessing the same type of resource. Missing 
authentication for critical function (no. 19) is 
where the software does not perform 
authentication for functionality that consumes a 
significant amount of resources or requires a 
provable user identity. Attacker’s access will 
depend on the associated functionality, but can 
range from reading or modifying data, access to 
privileged functionality, or the execution of code.  
Vulnerabilities that allow unrestricted upload 
(no.8) and download (no.20) of files can allow 
code to be run from a remote location, or allow 
files with dangerous extensions such as .php to be 
automatically processed without restrictions. 
Some software does not encrypt sensitive data 
when it should (no. 10), or does not use a proper 
cryptographic algorithm (no.24). If a secure 
channel is not used, such as SSL, or a tried and 
tested cryptographic algorithm to exchange 
sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker 
with access to the network traffic to eavesdrop 
and uncover the data. If a good cryptographic 
algorithm is used, it can then become ineffective if 
the key is hard coded into the software (no. 11). 
This error is surprisingly high up on the 
vulnerability list and allows an attacker to bypass 
the authentication that has been configured by the 
software administrator. 
Other unusual vulnerabilities that have made it to 
the top 25 include Software that does not properly 
check for unusual conditions that are not expected 
to occur on a day to day basis (no. 15) can miss 
loopholes that can be exploited by attackers. It 
may be assumed that certain conditions will never 
occur, such as low memory, or no access to 
resources, but attackers may use these unusual 
conditions to create instability or incorrect 
behaviour. Information exposure through an error 
message (no. 16) can be created by including too 
much error information such as personally 
identifiable information, authentication, and 
server configuration. This data can be used by any 
attacker to misuse software. A race condition (no. 
25) vulnerability can involve multiple processes or 
multiple threads in which the attacker has control 
over a process or thread. This can have an impact 
when the expected synchronisation is in security-
critical code, such as during authentication. 
7. Community Vulnerability matrix 
Vulnerabilities at the community scale are located 
within the communication and data flow, as well 
as those associated with physical node location, 
distribution, and mobility. Vulnerabilities within 
the network are often defined based upon their 
enabled attack scenario rather than the location of 
the actual vulnerability. Wood and Stankovic [13] 
however, categorise attacks into physical layers of 
the network stack. Bicakci and Tavli [28] discuss 
network attacks at the physical and MAC layers. 
Mishra & Nadkarni [29], Lane [30] and Wu et all 
[31] discuss attacks and vulnerabilities in wireless 
networks. This literature has been used to 
establish the links between vulnerability and 
location, and vulnerability and disturbance at the 
community scale. The detailed descriptions of 
each attack technique allow the various 
vulnerabilities and their links to be inferred (Tables 
8 and 9).  
Mobile and wireless nodes of a network are 
inherently more vulnerable than static ones (no.3). 
For example, there is no guarantee that a path 
between two nodes would be free of malicious 
nodes not complying with the employed protocol. 
This could lead to many attacks such as 
impersonation, repudiation, or the modification of 
routing messages such as black holes. Another 
vulnerability associated with the physical 
attributes of a community is the knowledge of the 
location of a device or community (no.1) such as a 
corporate network, or important building, 
particularly if they are physically insecure. This 
could allow targeted attacks such as the 
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introduction of a virus directed at a specific 
network location. Other techniques can be used 
such as impersonation or eavesdropping, or even 
the simple theft of devices. This is different from 
the individual scale where vulnerability was 
concerned with access ‘inside’ the device. Wireless 
networks that use fixed frequencies (no. 2) at the 
physical layer can be subject to jamming attacks. 
Frequency hopping is used to avoid this, but can 
still be subject to wide band jammers. For this 
reason some protocols also use spread spectrum, 
and code spreading techniques. This vulnerability 
is likely to be more prevalent in sensor networks 
where low power requirements force the design of 
fixed frequency communications.  
At the link layer, a number of vulnerabilities allow 
attackers to cause service disruption. These 
include: the transmissions from one node to 
another can be detected (no. 4) giving an attacker 
the opportunity to induce collisions, protocols that 
allow unlimited transmission requests (no.5) can 
be subject to resource exhaustion, channel priority 
schemes that rely on co-operation (no.6) may be 
unfairly blocked channel access, and protocols that 
rely on MAC address filtering (no.7) to identify 
individuals may have addresses deliberately 
changed for impersonation attacks.  
The network layer is concerned with routing, and 
within a mobile network every node is potentially 
a router with associated vulnerabilities. The use of 
dynamic routing (no. 8) can lead to misdirection or 
neglect and greed, where messages are incorrectly 
routed, not routed or they are given priority to the 
malicious node’s own messages. Using multiple 
(diverse) routing paths or sending redundant 
messages can reduce the effect of this attack. 
Location-based protocols that rely on geographic 
forwarding (no. 9) can allow homing attacks where 
a malicious node monitors routing traffic, and 
once the critical resources are found they can be 
attacked using other methods. Distance vector 
based protocols allow inconsistent route 
advertisements (no. 10) across the network 
meaning zero cost routes can be formed creating 
black hole attacks. On the other hand stateless 
protocols without source authentication (no.12) 
can allow incorrect replies disrupting the node. 
Networks that do not employ some kind of 
monitoring (no.11) scheme such as intrusion 
detection can make it difficult to detect when, 
how and what attacks are taking place, allowing all 
kinds of unknown malicious activity to continue 
un-noticed. Wireless networks tend to have a 
lower bandwidth limitation (no. 13) than wired 
networks and therefore attacks on wireless 
networks from a wired network can easily create 
flooding attacks. 
At the transport layer, protocols that must 
maintain state in memory (no. 14) are vulnerable 
to memory exhaustion through flooding where 
each request causes the victim to allocate memory 
for that particular connection. Some protocols at 
the transport layer allow synchronisation recovery 
(no.15) to retransmit missed frames. If the 
malicious node can maintain timing, it can prevent 
the end points from exchanging information, 
causing them to enter into an endless 
synchronisation-recovery cycle. When protocols 
authenticate at session set up (no.16), but not 
thereafter, a session hijacking attack may occur 
where the attacker steals the victim’s identity and 
then continues the session with the target node. 
This is known to occur in TCP and UDP protocols 
for example. 
Security techniques can be used to inspect or 
encrypt data but the decision to actually 
participate in communication (no.17) is down to 
the individual node. At the application layer this 
can be seen as a vulnerability where repudiation 
attacks can occur in which a node does not 
participate in all or part of the communications 
mechanism. Also at the application layer many 
user data types and protocols are supported 
(no.18) allowing malware to hitch a ride. Although 
malware can propagate at different layers of the 
network, the majority use the application layer. It 
is the act of connecting nodes together that 
facilitates the movement of such malware attack 
methods. The vulnerability effect of employing no 
or weak security can cause security mechanisms to 
be by-passed (no.19). This vulnerability can 
originate at the design stage or from poor 
configuration. It can be located at any of the 
physical layers but is only applicable to the 
functional location of authorisation / 
authentication. At the physical network layer this 
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may mean using scrambling, hopping, or spread 
spectrum techniques, at the link layer this may 
mean the use of encryption such as WEP (WLAN), 
A5 (GSM), and WPA, at the network layer this may 
mean using IPsec, at the transport layer this may 
mean using secure protocols such as SSL, TLS, and 
WTLS, at the application layer this may mean using 
ssh, S/MIME, and PGP. 
8. Ecosystem Vulnerability matrix 
There is little information on the specific analysis 
of security related vulnerabilities at the ecosystem 
scale within a digital ecosystem as defined within 
the context of this research. A small number of 
publications and reports have been reviewed both 
from the ecology domain and the digital security 
domain and have been adapted to fit into the 
context of this study. Digital ecosystems include 
not only communities of nodes working together 
to provide services, but also the physical 
application environment, users, organisations and 
regulations. Vulnerabilities have been included 
that reflect these areas (Tables 10 and 11). 
Users at the ecosystem scale who utilise the 
devices within the network and benefit from the 
services they provide have a number of universal 
vulnerabilities which can create common 
exploitation routes for cyber criminals [32]. The 
natural human user tendency to trust (no.1) is 
often exploited through social engineering. Attacks 
such as phishing, malicious emails and malware 
can often be motivated by identity and data theft, 
normally for financial purposes. Innocent users 
posting personal information on web sites or chat 
rooms, or even leaving company data on memory 
sticks (no.2) can accidentally leak information 
which can be used later by attackers. Often users 
lack technical skills (no.3) which can give rise to 
security mechanisms being by-passed, especially if 
they are not adequately set up or activated. Users 
also often have short or easy to crack passwords 
(no.5), which can result in security mechanisms 
being easily by-passed. Finally, depending upon 
the device, users may fail to monitor their device 
regularly (no.6) or simply forget where it was last 
located (no.4). Discovery by a malicious attacker 
could lead to Identity or data theft.  
Zavaleta et all [33] discusses vulnerabilities in 
natural ecosystems including those associated 
with whole communities. There are two relevant 
vulnerabilities to digital ecosystems. The first is 
that communities that are responsible for the 
generation, storage or transport of valued 
information may be more vulnerable to attacks 
(no.7). These attacks can appear at the individual 
or community scales in the form of targeted 
attacks exploiting software and hardware 
vulnerabilities, or causing network service 
disruptions. The second concerns communities 
that operate within a particular application 
environment that is either hostile or targeted by a 
particular threat (no.8). Such scenarios will be 
more vulnerable, and examples could involve a 
war zone where the risk from destructive attacks 
may be greater. Within an ecosystem there may 
be scenarios where device operations and the 
application is sensitive to environmental effects 
(no.9). So for example a body sensor network 
primarily used in the dry under a coat, suddenly 
becomes exposed to rain may have an effect on 
the sensor readings, processing of the data, and 
information being fed back to the main monitoring 
device. In this case this particular ecosystem is 
vulnerable to large environmental changes outside 
its normal operating range. An attacker may 
leverage this kind of vulnerability to disrupt nodes 
or falsify data. Weak policies on security 
standards, network operations and construction 
(no.10) is a vulnerability at the ecosystem scale 
allowing attackers to by-pass security and gain 
unauthorised access more easily. This type of 
vulnerability is filtered down to lower scales. The 
lack of adoption of new technology or upgrades 
(no.11) by users and manufacturers is another 
vulnerability giving attackers an easier route for 
entry. Systems that are not up to date expose 
many lower-scale vulnerabilities. Devices that are 
used for an application for which it was not 
intended (no.12) can lead to the exposure of 
untested bugs and vulnerabilities that cannot be 
patched. Jailbreaked i-phones for example allow 
users to install non-Apple applications, but have 
also been the target of malware Trojans.  
Another vulnerability includes the lack of general 
diversity (no.13) amongst communities and 
between communities which can lead to the same 
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vulnerability being targeted across many devices 
leading to the propagation of malware for example 
[34].  
The physical layout of the ecosystem (no.14), or 
connected topology may make it more vulnerable 
than others. Some topologies may be less resilient 
when faced with an attack scenario. In a server-
client network topology for example, if the server 
is compromised it could affect the entire network. 
In a distributed peer to peer network there is no 
main server so compromised devices can be 
removed without affecting the whole network. In 
natural ecosystems a study [35]  found that 
fragmentation, where communities were spread 
out and their locations were sparsely populated, 
resulted in ecosystems less able to adapt to 
disturbances making them less resilient. 
9. Discussion 
The vulnerability matrices allow consideration of 
vulnerabilities and their link to disturbances from 
different perspectives. This may assist in 
understanding when and where biodiversity 
strategies should be employed to mitigate against 
a specific vulnerability or disturbance. 
For example suppose it is required to address the 
hardware vulnerability of chip design complexity 
that requires outsourced manufacturing resulting 
in possible hidden malware or malicious circuits. It 
would be inappropriate to just concentrate on the 
manufacturing process of chips, because the 
design process also needs to be considered. In 
addition, consideration is needed towards the 
embedded software and firmware running on the 
chip across most functional categories. Any 
unaddressed aspect of the vulnerability will create 
a loop hole and an alternative route of 
exploitation. 
If instead the requirement is to stop the spread of 
malware, then vulnerabilities that allow the 
execution of code/commands and specific 
malware attacks need to be addressed. This covers 
a large number of vulnerabilities at all scales from 
low level chip code, to buffer copy software errors 
to communities of nodes supporting different data 
types. Such a requirement would include the 
vulnerabilities given in table 12. 
Table 12 – Vulnerabilities associated with 
malware spread 
 Vulnerability ID 
Ecosystem 1,3,6,10,11,12,13,14 
Community 1,11,18,19 
Individual 
SW 
1-5, 7-9, 11-15, 
17,18,20,21,23,25 
HW 1,3 
 
The incompleteness of the literature did not 
enable vulnerabilities outside of software to be 
listed in order of importance. Also the literature 
did not allow the inclusion of more specific attack 
methods outside of software. The information 
contained here has been extracted from the 
literature, or where this was not possible, inferred 
from the literature and as such some aspects may 
be open to interpretation. Even allowing for this, 
an observation regarding software vulnerabilities, 
in comparison to other vulnerabilities, is that they 
are more likely to be located in more than one 
physical location. There are some vulnerabilities 
that are found within web applications only, but 
vulnerabilities associated with buffers for example 
could potentially exist in many physical locations. 
In these instances the vulnerabilities seem to be 
better separable through functional location. This 
may be an important consideration for mitigation 
strategies. 
10. Conclusion 
This study considers computer networks from an 
ecosystem perspective with a focus on the location 
of vulnerabilities at different scales and their link 
to undesirable security disturbances. The location 
of vulnerabilities are considered from a physical, 
functional and time perspective. The link to 
security disturbances are considered through the 
exploitation route, the attack method, and the 
attack motivation. The matrices allow a specific 
vulnerability or disturbance to be analysed. For 
example there are many vulnerabilities associated 
with the spreading of malware across all scales. 
Buffer related vulnerabilities for example could 
potentially exist in many physical locations. In 
these instances the vulnerabilities seem to be 
better separable through functional location. 
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11. Vulnerability Matrices 
Table 4 – Individual (Hardware) Vulnerability-Location Matrix 
Vulnerability 
Location 
Physical Functional Source 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 c
ir
cu
it
 
Fi
rm
w
ar
e
 
Em
b
ed
d
e
d
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e
 
In
p
u
ts
 a
n
d
 o
u
tp
u
ts
 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
R
es
o
u
rc
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
A
u
th
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
/A
u
th
e
n
ti
ca
ti
o
n
 
D
at
a 
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
In
p
u
t/
 O
u
tp
u
t 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
D
es
ig
n
 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
/m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
 
C
o
n
fi
gu
ra
ti
o
n
/i
n
st
al
la
ti
o
n
 
O
p
er
at
io
n
 
1 Chip design complexity requires third party IP and outsource manufacturing p p p  f f f f  s s   
2 Hardware inputs and outputs are vulnerable to manipulation or monitoring    p     f s    
3 Low level chip  code vulnerability  
(see software vulnerability list Table 6/7, non web-based, non database-based) 
  p  f f f f f s s   
4 Hardware physical access inside device    p     f s  s  
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Table 5 – Individual (Hardware) Vulnerability-Disturbance Matrix 
Vulnerability  
Disturbance 
Exploitation Route Attack Methods Attack Goals 
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1 Chip design complexity requires third party IP and outsource manufacturing   r    m m      g  g g 
2 Hardware inputs and outputs are vulnerable to manipulation or monitoring  r r      m m    g g g  
3 Low level chip  code vulnerability  
(see software vulnerability list Table 6/7, non web-based, non database-based) 
r r r  r r  m   m   g  g g 
4 Hardware physical access inside device   r         m m g  g  
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Table 6 – Individual (Software) Vulnerability-Location Matrix 
Vulnerability 
Location 
Physical Functional Source 
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1 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation    p       f s s   
2 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command    p p    f  f s s  s 
3 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input p p p p p p  f     s   
4 Cross-Site Request Forgery    P     f  f  s   
5 Improper Authorisation    p p   f f   s s  s 
6 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision    p p    f  f s s   
7 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory    p  p  f   f s s   
8 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type    p       f s s   
9 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command    p       f s s   
10 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data    p p    f   s   s 
11 Use of Hard-coded Credentials p p p p p p   f   s    
12 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value p p p p p p  f     s   
13 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program    p    f   f s s   
14 Improper validation of array index p p p p p p  f  f f  s   
15 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions p p p p p p     f  s   
16 Information Exposure Through an Error Message p p p p p p     f s s s s 
17 Integer Overflow or Wraparound p p p p p p  f  f   s   
18 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size p p p p p p  f  f   s   
19 Missing Authentication for Critical Function    p p p   f   s    
20 Download of Code Without Integrity Check   p p     f   s s   
21 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource p p p p p p  f f   s s s s 
22 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling p p p p p p  f    s s s s 
23 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site    p       f s s   
24 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm  p p p  p   f   s    
25 Race Condition   p p p p  f    s s   
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Table 7 – Individual (Software) Vulnerability-Disturbance Matrix 
Vulnerability  
Disturbances 
Exploitation Routes Attack Methods (CAPEC number) Attack Goals 
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1 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation r r   r  m m                       g  g g 
2 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Cmd. r r r  r    m            m           g g  
3 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input   r  r r    m m                    g   g 
4 Cross-Site Request Forgery r r r  r r      m m                  g g g g 
5 Improper Access Control r r r  r   m  m    m m m                g g  
6 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision r       m                       g  g  
7 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory  r r  r r  m         m m m            g  g g 
8 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type     r   m                       g   g 
9 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command  r r  r r   m         m  m m          g  g g 
10 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data  r r     m       m        m   m      g g  
11 Use of Hard-coded Credentials r r   r   m       m       m         g g g g 
12 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value   r  r r    m                     g   g 
13 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require in PHP Program   r  r                      m    g   g 
14 Improper validation of array index  r r  r r    m                     g  g g 
15 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions r  r  r r                   m      g   g 
16 Information Exposure Through an Error Message  r r      m    m            m        g  
17 Integer Overflow or Wraparound   r  r r     m                    g   g 
18 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size   r  r r    m                     g   g 
19 Missing Authentication for Critical Function r           m  m          m m       g g  
20 Download of Code Without Integrity Check   r  r                    m      g   g 
21 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource  r r  r   m      m                 g g g g 
22 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling      r                   m     m g    
23 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site r  r  r r                       m  g g  g 
24 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm r r r            m                  g  
25 Race Condition  r r  r r                      m   g  g g 
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Table 8 – Community Vulnerability-Location Matrix 
Vulnerability 
Location 
Physical Functional Source 
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1. Physical device or community location p      f    s   s 
2. known/fixed wireless transmission frequency p         f s    
3. Dynamic nature of devices p         f s   s 
4. Transmission can be detected  p        f s    
5. Supports unlimited transmission requests  p        f s    
6. Channel priority scheme relies on co-operation  p        f s    
7. Reliance on MAC address filtering  p        f s    
8. Individual dynamic routing control   p      f  s    
9. Reliance on geographic forwarding   p      f  s    
10. Inconsistent route advertisements   p      f  s    
11. Lack of network monitoring   p   f     s    
12. Stateless protocol without source authentication   p     f   s    
13. Wireless bandwidth limitations   p       f s    
14. Protocols that maintain state in memory    p      f s    
15. Synchronisation recovery without authentication    p    f  f s    
16. Authentication at session set up only    p    f   s    
17. Node decision to participate in communications     P     f     
18. Connecting nodes supporting different data types     P     f s    
19. No/weak security – does this need splitting out? p p p p p   f   s  s  
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Table 9 – Community Vulnerability-Disturbance Matrix 
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Exploitation Route Attack Methods Attack Goals 
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1. Physical device or community location   r      m m             m m g g g g 
2. known/fixed wireless transmission frequency  r    r m m                 g  g  
3. Dynamic nature of devices r r    r    m     m m m m   m    g g g  
4. Transmission can be detected      r     m              g    
5. Unlimited transmission requests      r      m             g    
6. Channel priority scheme relies on co-operation      r       m            g    
7. Reliance on MAC address filtering      r    m               g g g  
8. Individual dynamic routing control      r        m  m         g  g  
9. Reliance on geographic forwarding      r         m          g  g  
10. Inconsistent route advertisements      r           m        g  g  
11. Lack of network monitoring r      m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m g g g g 
12. Stateless protocol without source authentication      r            m       g    
13. Wireless bandwidth limitations      r             m      g    
14. Protocols that maintain state in memory      r             m      g    
15. Synchronisation recovery without authentication      r              m     g    
16. Authentication at session set up only r r    r                m   g g g  
17. Node decision to participate in communications                     m    g    
18. Connecting nodes supporting different data types     r                  m  g g g g 
19. No/weak security r       m  m            m m  g g g g 
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Table 10 – Ecosystem Vulnerability-Location Matrix  
Vulnerability 
Location 
Physical Functional Source 
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1 Natural human user tendency to trust p        f    s 
2 User posting personal information on web sites/chat rooms, leaving company files on memory sticks p       f f    s 
3 Lack of understanding/computer skills to use the device securely p      f  f   s s 
4 User does not know or keep track of device location p    f        s 
5 Short, or easy to crack passwords p      f   s  s s 
6 User fails to monitor device regularly if in remote location such as a sensor network p    f     s  s s 
7 Community responsible for the generation, storage or transport of valued information.   p     f  s   s 
8 Communities of nodes that operate within a particular application environment that is either hostile or targeted by a 
particular threat. 
   p     f    s 
9 Device operations and application is sensitive to environmental effects   p p     f s  s s 
10 Weak policies on security standards, network operations and construction  p    f f   s    
11 Lack of adoption of new technology or upgrades by users\manufacturers p p    f   f s  s s 
12 Devices used for an application for which it was not intended p  p p  f   f    s 
13 Low diversity ecosystems    p   f    s   s 
14 Poor physical layout of ecosystem or connection topology p p p p  f    s   s 
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Table 11 – Ecosystem Vulnerability-Disturbance Matrix  
Vulnerability  
Disturbance 
Exploitation Route Attack Method Attack Goal 
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1 Natural human user tendency to trust  r r  r   m m m m m       g g  
2 User posting personal information on web sites/chat rooms, leaving company 
files on memory sticks 
 r         m m      g g  
3 Lack of understanding/computer skills to use the device securely r r     m m m m    m m  g g g g 
4 User does not know or keep track of device location   r         m      g g  
5 Short, or easy to crack passwords r             m    g g  
6 User fails to monitor device regularly if in remote location such as a sensor 
network 
 r r       m m m m m m  g g g g 
7 Community responsible for the generation, storage or transport of valued 
information. 
          m   m m m   g  
8 Communities of nodes that operate within a particular application environment 
that is either hostile or targeted by a particular threat. 
            m m m m g g g g 
9 Device operations and application is sensitive to environmental effects   r          m    g    
10 Weak policies on security standards, network operations and construction r      m m m m    m m m g g g g 
11 Lack of adoption of new technology or upgrades by users\manufacturers r         m    m m  g g g g 
12 Devices used for an application for which it was not intended r  r      m m    m m  g g g g 
13 Low diversity ecosystems  r r r  r r   m m m  m m m m g  g g 
14 Poor physical layout of ecosystem or connection topology  r r r r r r    m    m m  g  g g 
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